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Abstract
We study linear quadratic games played on a network. Agents face peer effects
with distance-one neighbors, and strategic substitution with distance-two neighbors
(local congestion). For this class of games, we show that an interior equilibrium
exists both in the high and in the low regions of the largest eigenvalue, but may not
exist in the intermediate region. In the low region, equilibrium is proportional to
a weighted version of Bonacich centrality, where weights are themselves centrality
measures for the network. Local congestion has the effect of decreasing equilibrium
behavior, potentially affecting the ranking of equilibrium actions. When strategic
interaction extends beyond distance-two, equilibrium is characterized by a “nested”
Bonacich centrality measure, and existence properties depend on the sign of strategic
interaction at the furthest distance. We support the assumption of local congestion
by presenting empirical evidence from a secondary school Dutch dataset.
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1 Introduction
Socio-economic decisions are typically taken in social networks defined by interpersonal,
institutional and technological ties. Within these networks, neighbors jointly consume and
produce goods, discuss political opinions, share information and beliefs. As a consequence,
neighbors in the network tend to display correlation in behavior. Positive correlation (and
in particular peer effects) has commanded substantial attention,1 partly because of its
pervasiveness in social interaction, and because it amplifies individual shocks acting as a
“social multiplier” (Glaeser et al., 2003).
In this paper we study problems in which strategic interdependency extends beyond
the social ties, to agents that are at distance-two or further away in the social network.
Most of our analysis deals with the case in which agents face peer effects at distance-one,
as well as strategic substitution at distance-two. We refer to this substitution effect as local
congestion. The term “local” refers to the assumption that actions generate congestion
through common neighbors, rather than at large in the social network.
Examples of local congestion abound in economics. In job-referral networks, agents
get to know about vacancies via their social ties, and compete for the information that be-
comes available to common neighbors. As shown by Calvo´-Armengol and Jackson (2004),
in the short run the incentives of an unemployed agent to actively search for a job are neg-
atively affected by how actively the other unemployed agents who share the same social
contacts (and, thereby, have access to the same sources of information) search. A simi-
lar effect of local competition shapes the incentives structure in collaboration networks,
where researchers compete for the limited time and attention of common co-authors.
Local congestion may also stem from the presence of negative local externalities. For
instance, a smoker may decide to limit smoking in the presence of friends or relatives
when these are already subject to large amounts of secondhand smoke. The incentive to
limit smoking stems from the perception of a large marginal health damage suffered by
the smoker’s congested friends. Pecuniary externalities may sort similar effects. Suppose
firms A and B use each other’s output as factor of production. Therefore, an increase in
firm A’s output level increases the demand for B’s product, and thus its price. This in
turn raises the marginal cost of all other firms that use B’s product as production factor.
The increase in the marginal cost will reduce these firms’ incentives to produce. Finally,
1Evans et al. (1992); Gaviria and Raphael (2001); Kirke (2004); Christakis and Fowler (2007); Clark
and Loheac (2007); Christakis and Fowler (2008); Calvo´-Armengol et al. (2009).
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local congestion can also be created by free-riding incentives of agents sharing a common
neighbor. In conflict networks, for instance, countries that share a common enemy tend
to free ride on each other in the production of armaments.
The aim of this paper is to trace equilibrium behavior to the topology of the social
network in problems with local congestion. This is a crucial issue for the design of network-
based policies that affect behavior by incentivizing the creation and/or the destruction of
social ties such as friendships, kinship, work relations and such. The key element of our
analysis, and a common feature of all the above examples, is that the adjacency matrix
of the social network does not coincide with the matrix of strategic interactions of the
game. In fact, the presence of local congestion both affects the intensity of distance-one
relationships (when two neighbors also share common neighbors), and creates channels of
strategic interaction not accounted for by the adjacency matrix of the network (between
agents who are not neighbors but share common neighbors). We show that the matrix of
strategic interaction is a weighted sum of the social network’s adjacency matrix and its
second power.
A recent literature investigates the relation between equilibrium behavior and the
pattern of social interaction in games with linear best replies. This relation has been
studied in Ballester et al. (2006) and Bramoulle´ et al. (2014), and then applied to the
analysis of various socio-economic problems (see for example Calvo´-Armengol et al., 2009;
Patacchini and Zenou, 2012, 2011; Ballester et al., 2010; Bloch and Que´rou, 2013; Topa
and Zenou, 2014). Ballester et al. (2006) is based on the observation that in this class
of games, the matrix of strategic interactions can be decomposed into the sum of a local
complementarity matrix and of a global substitution matrix, plus an idiosyncratic element.
Ballester et al. (2006) shows that when an interior equilibrium exists, this is proportional
to the vector of Bonacich centralities for the local complementarity matrix. Bramoulle´
et al. (2014) allows also for multiple non interior equilibria with active and inactive agents.
We follow this literature by focusing on games with linear best replies, and, as in
Ballester et al. (2006), we look at interior equilibria. We note that, although the above
decomposition can be applied to our problem with local congestion, the local comple-
mentarity matrix so obtained does not coincide with the adjacency matrix of the social
network, and does not preserve its fundamental properties. The problem of tracing be-
havior to the topology of the social network cannot therefore be addressed by direct
application of Ballester et al. (2006) results. As we discuss in detail below, this crucial
difference implies that equilibrium behavior relates to the network via a variant of the
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Bonacich centrality measure.
We frame our results in terms of the effect of local congestion on both the existence and
the characterization of equilibrium. In particular, we take as benchmark the case of peer
effects only, in which the adjacency matrix of the social network does coincide with the
matrix of strategic interaction (and with the local complementarity matrix in Ballester
et al., 2006). For this case, equilibrium is found only in the low range of the largest
eigenvalue. We show that in the presence of local congestion, an interior equilibrium
exists both in networks with high largest eigenvalue and in networks with low largest
eigenvalue. The intuition for this result is immediate in the class of regular networks,
whose eigenvalue equals the average degree: as the network becomes denser, distance-two
channels of strategic substitution tend to grow faster than distance-one channels of peer
effects, and this eventually bounds the magnitude of equilibrium feedbacks.
We then turn to the characterization of equilibrium. We show that in the low range
of the largest eigenvalue, equilibrium is characterized by a weighted Bonacich centrality
measure for the social network, where weights are themselves centrality measures for
the same network. Using our characterization, we show that the introduction of local
congestion always decreases equilibrium behavior, and that such a decrease is larger for
agents who are more central in the social network. We provide an example where this
produces a reversal in the ranking of agents’ equilibrium actions with respect to the
case of peer effects only. We then perform comparative statics with respect to the social
network. Within the class of regular networks, we show that the relation between behavior
and network density is non monotonic: behavior first increases and then decreases after
a critical density level is attained. We also find that creating cliques unambiguously
contracts aggregate behavior.
We extend the model with local congestion to encompass strategic effects beyond
distance-two in the social network. This is relevant, for instance, in the adoption of
safe behaviors in the presence of a transmittable disease, where someone’s incentives to
adopt the safe behavior depends on the probability that her neighbors are infected. This
in turn depends on the adoption of safe behaviors by all other agents to whom these
neighbors are directly or indirectly connected. We show that the existence of an interior
equilibrium crucially depends on the sign of the strategic interaction taking place at
the furthest distance. In particular, an interior equilibrium exists in the region of high
largest eigenvalues when strategic interaction at the furthest distance is of the substitute
type. We also show that in the region of low largest eigenvalues, equilibrium behavior is
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characterized in terms of a “nested” variant of Bonacich centrality. This generalizes the
characterization result for the case of local congestion to this more complex case.
Finally, we provide empirical evidence of the existence of a negative correlation in
behavior at distance-two, consistent with the presence of local congestion. We focus on
doing homework, a behavior that generates interaction patterns of the type described for
collaboration networks. The empirical analysis uses data from a novel dataset containing
information about over 2,500 Dutch secondary school pupils.
We note that a notion similar to what we call local congestion is present in previous
works on network economics, where it has been mainly formalized in terms of the effect
of the “degree” of a node on the incentives of other nodes to link to that node. The
“co-author model”, first proposed by Jackson and Wolinsky (1996), contains the general
idea that the benefits coming from a connection may be limited when this is incident to
a very connected node. This idea is embedded in various models of network formation,
and it is key in determining the agents’ incentives to form and sever links. Examples of
such models include Morrill (2011); Billand et al. (2012, 2013); Mo¨hlmeier et al. (2016).
Differently from these papers, we refer to local congestion as the impact of the “actions”
taken by a neighbor of a given node on the incentives to act of the other neighbors of
that same node. Finally, congestion in distance-two relations is behind Wahba and Zenou
(2005) analysis of job market networks, where the probability of finding a job through
social contacts (weak ties) decreases at high levels of network density. This is due to
the relative speed of growth of distance-one and distance-two relations (and the ensuing
competition effects), a mechanism at all similar to the one behind our non monotonicity
result in the density-behaviour relation.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 sets up the formal model with local con-
gestion. Section 3 studies equilibrium existence and characterization. Section 4 extends
the basic model to encompass interaction at arbitrary distance in the network. Section 5
brings the model to the data. Section 6 concludes the paper.
2 A Model with Peer Effects and Local Congestion
We consider a set N of n agents, organized in a network g, defined by a n × n matrix
G whose generic entry gij ∈ {0, 1} measures the presence of a social tie between agents
i and j. We assume that the network is undirected, gij = gji for all i, j ∈ N , and we let
gii = 0 for all i. When gij = 1 we say that agents i and j are neighbors in g. The number
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of neighbors of agent i in g is called the degree of agent i and is denoted by di. A walk of
length m between agents i and j in g is defined as a finite sequence of agents (kn)n=1,...,m
such that k1 = i, km = j and gknkn−1 = 1 for all n = 2, ...,m. The generic term g
[2]
ij of the
power matrix G2 counts the number of walks of length-two from node i to node j in g
(notice that g
[2]
ii = di).
The payoff function in (1) defines the payoff of agent i given a vector x ∈ Rn+ of actions
and the network g:
Ui(x) = αxi − σ
2
x2i + φ
∑
j∈N
gijxixj − γ
∑
k∈N
g
[2]
ik xixk (1)
The first two terms of (1) capture the private benefits from one’s own action. These
benefits are the sum of a linear increasing part and a quadratic decreasing part, with
intensity measured respectively by parameters α and σ. The third term captures the
peer effect: the marginal incentive to act increases in the sum of the actions taken by
neighbors. The intensity of such complementarity is measured by the parameter φ > 0.
In the fourth term, each entry g
[2]
ik counts the number of lenght-two walks from i to k. This
term describes an indirect strategic interdependence: if γ > 0, the marginal incentives to
act decrease in the aggregate level of actions taken at distance-two in the network. We
call local congestion this strategic substitution effect between agents at distance-two in g.
In Appendix A we sketch three micro-founded economic problems characterized by local
congestion, yielding the utility function (1) as a reduced form.
3 Equilibrium
3.1 The Matrix of Strategic Interaction
We start by laying out the matrix of strategic interaction associated with the payoff
function (1) and with a given adjacency matrix G. This matrix, that we call G˜, keeps
track of both peer effects at distance-one and substitution effects at distance-two in the
network g. An interior equilibrium x is characterized by the following FOCs:
α · 1 =
[
σI− φG˜
]
x, (2)
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where G˜ is defined as:
G˜ ≡ G− γ
φ
G2. (3)
Strategic interaction in G˜ is defined with respect to both the network G and its power
matrix G2. Note that G˜ is symmetric, being the sum of symmetric matrices, and therefore
has real valued eigenvalues. The generic entry of G˜ is given by:
g˜ij =

0 if gij = 0 and g
[2]
ij = 0
1 if gij = 1 and g
[2]
ij = 0
−γ
φ
g
[2]
ij if gij = 0 and g
[2]
ij > 0
1− γ
φ
g
[2]
ij if gij = 1 and g
[2]
ij > 0
(4)
Let us consider each of the four possibilities of (4) in detail. In the first line, since
i and j are neither directly nor indirectly connected in g, they experience neither peer
effects nor local congestion, and g˜ij = 0. In the second line, i and j are neighbors in g but
do not share any common neighbor; as a consequence, their interaction consists in the
peer effect only. In the third line, i and j share a common neighbor but are not neighbors;
there are no peer effects at work, but there is local congestion. Note that this entry grows
in magnitude with the number of common neighbors. Note also that g˜ii = −γφdi, so that
G˜ always contains negative entries. Finally, in the fourth line i and j are both direct and
indirect neighbors, and the sign of their interaction depends on the relative magnitude of
peer effects and local congestion. Both the issues of existence and characterization of an
interior equilibrium can be addressed by referring to the notion of Bonacich centrality.
Definition 1 (Bonacich Centrality) Let A be an adjacency matrix, and let a ∈ R+ be
a discount parameter. i) The Bonacich centrality matrix is given by M(A, a) ≡ [I−aA]−1;
ii) The vector of Bonacich centralities is given by b(A, a) ≡M(A, a) ·1; iii) The vector of
weighted Bonacich centralities with weights vector w is given by bw(A, a) = M(A, a) ·w.
Our analysis of existence of a unique interior equilibrium makes use of Ballester et al.
(2006) construction of the normalized n× n matrix C (that they call ‘local interaction
matrix”), whose generic entry cij =
g˜ij+θ
λ
∈ [0, 1] is defined in terms of our model by
the following parameters: the absolute value θ of the maximal substitutability in G˜; the
maximal complementarity δ in G˜; and their range λ ≡ δ+ θ. Let us also denote by µ1(C)
the largest eigenvalue of C. Ballester et al. (2006) have shown that if µ1(C) <
σ
φλ
, there
exists a unique interior equilibrium which is proportional to Bonacich centralities in C. In
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the next subsection we use the above construction and result to obtain explicit conditions
on the eigenvalues of the network G for the existence of an interior equilibrium.
3.2 Existence
In preparation of Proposition 1, containing our main existence results, we discuss the
relationship between the spectral properties of the matrix C described above and the
adjacency matrix G of the social network. For a generic square matrix A, let µ(A) the
vector of its eigenvalues. From the definition of G˜ in (3), for all i = 1, ..., n we can associate
the ith eigenvalue of G with a jth eigenvalue of G˜. Formally, we define by I(G) and I(G˜)
the set of indexes of the eigenvalues of the two matrices, and by ρ : I(G) → I(G˜) the
bijection between the elements of the two sets. With a little abuse of notation we define
as j(i) the index j ∈ I(G˜) such that j = ρ(i). Then we can write the map ρ as follows:2
µj(i)(G˜) = µi(G)− γ
φ
µ2i (G). (5)
Two remarks are in order here. First, the mapping in (5) is non monotonic, and
therefore it does not preserve the order of the eigenvalues of G. It follows that, in
general, µ1(G) is not mapped into µ1(G˜), that is ρ(1) 6= 1. Second, the map defined in
(5) is strictly concave. Define i∗ ∈ I(G) as the index such that ρ(i∗) = 1. That is, µi∗(G)
is mapped into µ1(G˜). Let us then decompose C as follows:
C =
1
λ
G˜ +
θ
λ
U (6)
where U is a matrix of ones. It follows that for a vector of shifts y we can write:
µ(C) =
1
λ
µ(G˜) + y (7)
Since (7) defines a monotone map (see the proof of Proposition 1), it follows that the
eigenvalue µi∗(G), is mapped into µ1(C) via the relations (6) and (7).
In Proposition 1 we use the analysis above to provide a novel result relating existence
of an interior equilibrium to conditions on the spectral properties of the network g. These
conditions bound the magnitude of the largest eigenvalue µ1(G) and reflect the twofold
2The result come from the fact that, for a generic square matrix A and an associated polynomial
q(A), the eigenvectors µ(q(A)) = q(µ(A)). Note also that, in the analysis to follow, the assumption of
symmetry of G is key since it guarantees that G is Hermitian (and this property is used in the proof of
Proposition 1).
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effect of each link in G: to create both one additional channel of peer effects and new
channels of indirect substitution. Let d¯ ≡ max{di|i ∈ N} and dˆ ≡ σnφγ − φ4nφγ2 .
Proposition 1 A unique interior equilibrium exists if one of the following conditions
hold:
i. d¯ < dˆ;
ii. µ1(G) <
φ−
√
−4γσ+4γλφy1+φ2
2γ
;
iii. µ1(G) >
φ
2γ
, and either µi∗(G) <
φ−
√
−4γσ+4γλφyi∗+φ2
2γ
or µi∗(G) >
φ+
√
−4γσ+4γλφyi∗+φ2
2γ
.
Proposition 1 points to a remarkable role for local congestion: an interior (positive)
equilibrium exists when µ1(G) is either large or small, while existence may fail for inter-
mediate values of µ1(G). This result is in stark contrast with the case of peer effects only
(i.e., of γ = 0), where an interior equilibrium fails to exist for large values of µ1(G). To
get an intuition for this result, it is useful to consider the relation between the largest
eigenvalue and the average degree, a rough measure of network density. Given that G
is symmetric, the Min-Max theorem for Hermitian matrices directly implies that the av-
erage degree of G is a lower bound for the largest eigenvalue µ1(G) (see Teschl, 2014,
p.117). Point iii. in Proposition 1 can be therefore interpreted as an existence result for
very dense networks. The role of local congestion is easy to grasp: as density increases,
the additional distance-two interaction channels (of the substitute type) have the effect of
mitigating the positive impact on behavior of the additional direct complementarity chan-
nels. Point iii. states that this effect bounds equilibrium actions when density is large
enough. The intuition behind Proposition 1 is best illustrated for the class of regular
networks in the following example.
Example 1 (Regular Networks) In regular networks, the average degree d in g co-
incides with the largest eigenvalue µ1(G) and comparative statics directly on d can be
performed. The unique (symmetric) interior equilibrium is given by:3
x∗i =
α
σ − φd+ γd2 (8)
3We focus on symmetric equilibria since, when they exist, they are the unique solution of the FOCs.
An analysis of asymmetric equilibria could imply the study of the cases where equilibria are not interior,
which is beyond the scope of this paper (see Bramoulle´ et al., 2014).
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The above expression is well defined and positive if and only if either d ≤ φ−
√
φ2−4γσ
2γ
or
d ≥ φ+
√
φ2−4γσ
2γ
. Note also that the small (large) root is decreasing (increasing) in φ, cap-
turing the fact that strengthening local congestion allows for equilibrium in a smaller set
of networks. Indeed, when peer effects become more intense, either sparser networks (with
fewer channels of complementarity) or denser networks (where distance-two channels of
interaction grow fast enough compared to the number of direct channels) are needed to
recover existence of a positive equilibrium. Also, the small (large) root is increasing (de-
creasing) in γ, capturing the fact that strengthening local congestion allows for equilibrium
in a larger set of networks.
3.3 Characterization
In this section we explore the relation between equilibrium behavior and centrality in the
network g. We then build on this relation to discuss the effect of (small degrees of) local
congestion on both the levels and the ranking of individual actions at equilibrium. We
finally study the effect of changes in the network g on individual and aggregate behavior.
3.3.1 Equilibrium and Centrality
From system (2), an interior equilibrium solves the following equality:
x = α
[
σI− φG˜
]−1
1 (9)
Under the sufficient conditions on the eigenvalues of G highlighted in Proposition 1,
system (9) provides the full characterization of the interior equilibrium in terms of the
matrix G and its power matrix G2.
In the next proposition, we provide a characterization of equilibrium which applies to
networks with a small largest eigenvalue. We show that equilibrium is characterized by a
weighted version of the Bonacich centrality vector of G, where both the weighting vector
and the discount factors take the strength of local congestion into account. To state the
proposition, we first need to define the following two scalars4
a1 =
φ+
√
φ2 − 4γσ
2σ
, a2 =
φ−√φ2 − 4γσ
2σ
. (10)
4We can also invert the order of the two scalars, i.e., a1 =
φ−
√
φ2−4γσ
2σ and a2 =
φ+
√
φ2−4γσ
2σ
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Proposition 2 Let φ > 2
√
γσ and µ1(G) <
2σ
φ+
√
φ2−4γσ
. Then the unique interior Nash
equilibrium of the game is given by:
x =
α
σ
bb(G,a1)(G, a2) < 0 (11)
The weighted centrality that in Proposition 2 characterizes equilibrium behavior is
“nested”, meaning that weights are themselves Bonacich centralities of the network g.
Two remarks are in order. First, when γ = 0, the upper bound for µ1(G) is
σ
φ
. This
means that Proposition 2 applies to all networks where, in the absence of congestion,
a unique interior equilibrium exists by results from Ballester et al. (2006). Second, the
upper bound is increasing in γ, which implies that an increase in γ enlarges the set of
admissible networks. These two observations allow us to use Proposition 2 to measure
the effect of introducing small levels of local congestion on equilibrium behavior.
Proposition 3 The decrease in equilibrium behavior due to the introduction of small
levels of local congestion is given by:
dx
dγ
∣∣∣∣
γ=0
=
1
φ
·M(G, φ
σ
) ·
(
d−G · b(G, φ
σ
)
)
< 0. (12)
The introduction of local congestion decreases equilibrium behavior for the following rea-
son. The ith entry of the vector G · b(G, φ
σ
) measures the sum of Bonacich centralities
of all neighbors of i in G. Thus, the ith entry of the vector
(
d−G · b(G, φ
σ
)
)
sums up,
across all neighbors of i, the difference between 1 and each neighbor’s Bonacich centrality.
Since Bonacich centralities are strictly larger than 1, this difference is strictly negative for
all agents. Proposition 3 also shows how the reduction in behavior is distributed across
agents: the reduction is larger for those agents who are ‘better connected” to agents whose
neighbors are very central in g (i.e., for agents for which the matrix M(G, φ
σ
) associates
a large entry to agents whose neighbors are very central). The intuition is clear: very
central agents are characterized by large actions, and those who are closely connected to
neighbors of very central agents are exposed to high levels of indirect substitution, and
therefore suffer more than others from the introduction of local congestion.
One important issue is whether the implied modification of equilibrium behavior can
result in a change in the ranking of individual actions. A general answer for arbitrary
values of γ is complex due to the strong non linearity of centrality measures. However, we
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can address this issue in the context of simple network architectures, where central and
peripheral agents in g are clearly identified. In Figure 1 and Table 1 we consider three
different networks: the star, the butterfly and the connected star. Consistently with
expression (12), the impact of γ is not uniform across agents and across networks (see
the last two columns of Table 1). In particular, in the star and the butterfly, agent 1 has
the largest behavior (as in the case of γ = 0), while this is not the case in the connected
star, where the ranking of the agents’ actions is inverted. Consistently with the intuition
behind Proposition 3, the sharp decrease in agent 1’s behavior in the connected star is
due to his many links towards agents with sufficiently large degree, suffering therefore
from consistent congestion levels.
1
2 3 4 5
1
2
34
5
1
2
3 4
5
Figure 1: Star, Butterfly and Connected Star Networks
Table 1: Effect of γ on equilibrium actions
Network agents γ = 0 γ = 0.51 |x0 − x0.51| |x0 − x0.51|/x0
Star 1 Center 0.2916 0.2275 0.0641 0.2198
2-5 Periphery 0.2291 0.1850 0.0441 0.1925
Butterfly 1 Center 0.3023 0.1956 0.1067 0.3530
2-5 Periphery 0.2558 0.1814 0.0744 0.2909
Connected Star 1 Center 0.3157 0.1650 0.1507 0.4774
2-5 Periphery 0.2894 0.1652 0.1242 0.4292
Parametrization: α = 2, φ = 1, σ = 10, in equation (1). Networks are shown in Figure 1.
3.3.2 Changing the Network
In this section we study the effect of changes in the topology of the network g on equi-
librium behavior. We first focus on the impact of changes in the density of the network.
While in the absence of local congestion, adding links unambiguously increases individual
and aggregate behavior (see Ballester et al., 2006), the effect is ambiguous in the pres-
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ence of local congestion, due to the additional substitution channels at distance-two. We
address this issue by considering changes in the average degree of regular networks.
In a regular network, the symmetric equilibrium is characterized by equation (8). We
can study the impact of an increase in d on equilibrium behavior by considering the sign
of the following derivative:
∂x∗
∂d
=
α(φ− 2γd)
[σ − φd+ γd2]2
. (13)
determined by the following regions:
d < φ
2γ
⇒ ∂x∗
∂d
> 0
d = φ
2γ
⇒ ∂x∗
∂d
= 0
d > φ
2γ
⇒ ∂x∗
∂d
< 0
We see that equilibrium behavior and network density are related according to a
non-monotonic pattern, with maximal behavior at d = φ
2γ
. The forces driving the non-
monotonic pattern are the following. Distance-two connections (responsible for strategic
substitution) grow at the square of the speed of direct connections (channeling the peer
effects), and eventually take over, causing a decrease in overall behavior. Outside the
class of regular networks, we look at which changes in the topology of a given network
would unambiguously decrease (increase) aggregate behavior.
Proposition 4 Consider the network g′ obtained from g by fully connecting an indepen-
dent set Z of nodes of cardinality |Z| in g. Let x′ and x denote the associated equilibrium
vectors. If |Z|≥ φ
γ
+ 2, then x′ ≤ x.
Proposition 4 shows that a sufficient condition to reduce behavior is the presence of
a large enough set of agents who are not connected in g; the number of such agents is
inversely related to the intensity of local congestion γ. Behavior is reduced by creating
very dense relations among these sparse agents, so that new direct ties come with enough
new indirect interaction channels. If the number |Z| of these agents is not high enough
with respect to the complementarity/substitutability ratio φ
γ
, the new connections will
create complementarity channels that are not counteracted by a large enough number of
indirect substitution channels.
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4 Strategic Interaction at Arbitrary Distance
In this section, we extend our framework to encompass strategic interaction at arbitrary
distance in the network. Consider a situation where agent i is exposed to the transmis-
sion of a disease from his neighbors. Each interaction determines the transmission with
some given probability. Agent i can take a (costly) action reducing the probability of
transmission. The incentives of agent i to take action depend on the likelihood that his
neighbors are infected, which in turns depends on the actions taken at distance-two and
the implied risks of contagion. Differently from the set up in Section 2, in this example
i’s incentives are affected also by actions taken at distances larger than two, through the
effect that these actions have on the probability of i’s neighbors to be reached by the dis-
ease. Within the context of this example, it can be expected that all indirect interaction
is of the strategic substitute type, since the larger the action at any distance, the smaller
the probability of i’s neighbors to be infected.
Yet, one could also envisage problems where the sign of strategic interaction alternates
with distance. Consider for instance the following variant of the collaboration networks
model sketched in Appendix A. Agents sharing a common collaborator compete for his
time and effort; a busier collaborator (i.e, one with very active collaborators) is less
attractive and provides weaker peer effects. Differently from the model in Appendix A,
assume now that if i and j collaborate, the decrease in the peer effects enjoyed by i
is milder when j’s collaborators are themselves very busy. In this set-up, interaction
extends beyond distance-two; in particular, we expect strategic substitution at distance-
two, complementarity at distance-three, substitution again at distance-four, and so on.
To keep the general analysis tractable, we assume that the type of strategic interaction
(substitution vs. complementarity) between two agents only depends on their distance
in the network, and that all agents at the same distance experience the same kind of
strategic interaction. The utility function is written by augmenting (1) with interaction
at distance up to R ≥ 2:
Ui = αixi − σ
2
x2i +
R∑
r=1
∑
j∈N
φrg
[r]
ij xixj. (14)
In (14), r = 1, . . . , R denotes the distance, g
[r]
ij is the generic entry of the power matrix
Gr and φr is the associated coefficient. If φr > 0 any two agents at distance r experience
strategic complementarity, while if φr < 0 they experience strategic substitution, and if
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φr = 0 there is no strategic interaction.
4.1 Existence
The FOCs for an interior equilibrium are:
α · 1 =
[
σI− φ1G˜
]
x, (15)
where the adjacency matrix G˜ of strategic interaction is defined as follows:
G˜ ≡ G +
R∑
r=2
φr
φ1
Gr. (16)
As in (7), we relate the eigenvalues of the matrices C and G˜ as follows:
µ(C) =
1
λ
µ(G˜) + y (17)
and, using the definition of G˜ and recalling the mapping ρ : I(G)→ I(G˜) introduced
in Section 3.2, the ith eigenvalue of C and jth eigenvalue of G as:
µj(i)(C) =
1
λ
[µi(G) +
R∑
r=2
φr
φ1
µri (G)] + yi (18)
As in section 3.2, we define µi∗(G) as the i
∗th eigenvalue of G that is mapped into
µ1(C). Following the steps of Proposition 1 we can state the following:
Proposition 5 Consider the problem in (14). A sufficient condition for the existence of
a unique interior equilibrium is that, 1
λ
[µi∗(G) +
∑R
r=2
φr
φ1
µri∗(G)] + yi∗ <
σ
φ1λ
.
In order to derive specific bounds for the eigenvalues one would need to know the
polynomial in (17). Yet, we can use Proposition 5 to infer the qualitative properties
of these bounds. In particular, we argue that networks with high largest eigenvalues
are consistent with an interior equilibrium provided interaction at furthest distance is of
the substitute type. To the extent that the largest eigenvalue can be interpreted as an
indicator of the density of the network, this result points to the idea that in dense networks
the large number of indirect interaction channels of the substitute type can bound the
equilibrium feedbacks and allow for an interior solution. Assume, for simplicity, that
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µ1(G) is mapped into µ1(G˜), that is ρ(1) = 1 and i
∗ = 1. Then, as µ1(G) grows, the
term:
µ1(C) =
1
λ
[µ1(G) +
R∑
r=2
φr
φ1
µr1(G)] + y1 (19)
remains bounded above by the term σ
φλ
(as required by Proposition 5) if and only if
φR < 0, that is, if and only if interaction at the largest distance in the network is of
the substitute type. This is in line with the results obtained for local congestion. As
previously, we illustrate this result in the class of regular networks, where the largest
eigenvalue coincides with the average degree.
Example 2 (Regular Networks) We parametrize regular networks by their common
degree d. A symmetric interior equilibrium takes the following form:
x =
α
1−∑Rr=1 φrdr . (20)
As the average degree d grows, expression (20) remains positive if and only if φR < 0.
4.2 Characterization
We now turn to the characterization of an interior equilibrium. Proposition 6 extends
Proposition 2 to the case of interaction up to an arbitrary distanceR. Our characterization
relies on the novel notion of “Nested Weighted Centrality”, introduced below.
Definition 2 (Nested Weighted Bonacich Centrality) The Nested Weighted Cen-
trality of order s is the vector b[s](G, as) defined recursively as follows:
b[1](G, a1) = b(G, a1) (21)
b[2](G, a2) = bb[1](G,a1)(G, a2) (22)
and
b[s](G, as) = bb[s−1](G,as−1)(G, as), for s ∈ N (23)
In preparation of the next Proposition, we introduce the terms Sr for r = 1, 2, ..., R.
For a given R and a given vector of parameters a ≡ (ai)i=1,...,R, we denote by Tr(a) the
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set of all unordered tuples of distinct r elements from the set A ≡ {ai}i=1,...,R. A generic
element of Tr(a) is called tr(a). We then define:
Sr = (−1)r−1
∑
tr(a)∈Tr(a)
∏
ai∈tr(a)
ai
So, S1 denotes the sum of all the parameters of A, S2 the (negative of the) sum of all
products of (unordered) pairs of parameters of A, S3 the sum of all products of (unordered)
triples of parameters of A and so on.
Proposition 6 Assume there exists a sequence of non-negative scalars (ai)i=1,...,R such
that Sr =
φk
σ
, for k = 1, . . . , R. If µ1(G) · max{ai}i=1,...,R < 1, then the unique interior
equilibrium satisfying the FOCs (15) can be written as follows:
x =
α
σ
b[R](G, aR). (24)
The following example (R = 3), provides and explicit account of the terms Sk, of the
associated constraints and of the nested structure underlying the above characterization.
Example 3 Let R=3. The first order conditions in (15) take the following form:
α · 1 = σ[I−
3∑
i=1
φr
σ
Gr]x, (25)
where
[I−
3∑
i=1
φr
σ
Gr] = [I− φ1
σ
G− φ2
σ
G2 − φ3
σ
G3]. (26)
If there exists a vector (a1, a2, a3) ∈ R3+ satisfying the following constraints:
φ1
σ
= a1 + a2 + a3 = S1
φ2
σ
= −(a1a2 + a1a3 + a2a3) = S2
φ3
σ
= a1a2a3 = S3
then we can write:
[I− φ1
σ
G− φ2
σ
G2 − φ3
σ
G3] = [I− a1G][I− a2G][I− a3G]. (27)
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Using (23) and (27), equilibrium is characterized by:
x =
α
σ
b[3](G, a3) (28)
5 Local Congestion: Empirical Evidence
The aim of this section is to investigate the empirical relevance of local congestion. As an
individual action we consider putting effort in doing homework, claiming that it originates
both peer effects between friends and substitution effects at distance-two in the friendship
network. Substitution at distance-two occurs if students face low incentives to work when
their friends are busy doing homework with their own respective friends. The mechanism
is the following. A student whose friends are very active in doing homework is expected to
experience substantial opportunities of collaboration (peer effects). At the same time, a
student may find it difficult to collaborate with ‘busy’ friends, that is friends surrounded
by very active friends. As a consequence, the more active those students that share friends
with i, the more likely i is isolated, and the lower i’s incentives to do homework. Notice
that incentives in this problems are similar to those in problems of scientific collaboration.
To the extent that the above mechanism is in place, we expect to find a positive
association at distance-one in the network and a negative one at distance-two. We show
that this is indeed the case, and adding interaction at further distance does not increase
the explanatory power of the model. The empirical analysis is purely descriptive and aims
at showing the existence of a negative correlation at distance-two. Given that the error
term is spatially autocorrelated, we follow Bramoulle´ et al. (2009) who instrument peer
effects with the matrix of distance-two neighbors’ demographics (and its higher powers).
Differently from Bramoulle´ et al. (2009), we need to instrument both the behavior of
friends and that of friends of friends. As a consequence, the only available instruments
are demographic characteristics at distance three and further. These instruments are valid
because they are correlated both to the friends and distance-two neighbors’s behaviors,
and they do not directly affect the outcome of interest. However, we stress that while
Bramoulle´ et al. (2009) focus on the identification of peer effect in models without local
congestion, a structural estimation of the parameters of our model is beyond the scope of
this paper.
We use data from Networks and Actor Attributes in Early Adolescence’, a longitudinal
survey collected in the Netherlands between 2003 and 2004 (see Knecht, 2004; Corten and
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Knecht, 2013). The survey contains information about pupils enrolled in the first year
of secondary school. Such pupils have been interviewed four times every three months
between the first month after enrolment and the end of the first year. The sample consists
of about 120 classes in 14 different schools. We use the last wave of the survey because
we believe that the knowledge of distance-two friends (and the local congestion created
by them) is crucial in our model and the relationships between the pupils are not well
known in the first months of school.
Data contain also an indication of the network pupils are embedded in. We consider
the network of best friends (up to 12 nominations), because links are strong, known and
often bilateral.5 To construct an undirected network, with a corresponding symmetric
adjacency matrix, we give value 1 to the link between i and j if either i nominated j, or j
nominated i (or both). Some descriptive network statistics are included in Table 2, while
Figures 2 and 3 represent the network and its properties. The dataset contains a variable
that measures whether the pupils always do homework. The variable is categorical and
takes value from 1 to 5, where 1 indicates ‘very true’ and 5 ‘not true at all’. We reverse
the order to have a variable increasing in effort. Descriptive statistics on the sample and
the variable of interest are included in Table 3 and Figure 4.
Table 2: Network statistics
Degree Distance-two Degree Component Size
Mean 5.3049 31.6596 16.1989
Max 15 106 29
Min 0 0 1
Median 5 29 19
Std 2.4286 19.5363 9.4742
‘Networks and Actor Attributes in Early Adolescence’ (Wave 4). Authors’ calculations.
In our regressions we control for a set of demographic characteristics. Individual
controls are: a) gender; b) a dummy variable indicating whether or not the language
spoken at home is Dutch (to have a proxy of their ethnicity); c) age;6 d) money pupils
5Networks are defined at the classroom level. Other network definitions would be a) classmates
respondent receives practical support from; b) classmates respondent receives emotional support from;
c) classmates respondent has been friends with at primary school; d) classmates respondent talks about
personal things; e) classmates respondent would like to be friends with; f) classmates respondent meets
outside school; g) classmates who likes same music as respondent; h) classmates respondent would lend
25 Euro; i) classmates whose opinion is important for respondent
6Age is pretty homogeneous given pupils are all enrolled in the first year of secondary school, but some
some older pupils are also attending these classes.
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Figure 2: Network Representation. ‘Networks and Actor Attributes in Early Adolescence’
(Wave 4)
receive from their parents, as a proxy of family income. To control for the influence of
network characteristics different from behavior, we include the average of the individual
controls at the friends’ level. Finally, to capture unobservables at the school and at the
class level, we include school dummies (school fixed effects) and the kind of educational
track the pupil is enrolled in.7
Table 4 displays correlations in behavior. Gy, G2y, and G3y are respectively the sum
of the action chosen by friends, distance-two friends and distance-three friends, with zeros
on the principal diagonal of matrices G, G2 and G3. Correlation between the actions is
always positive due to the cascade generated by the peer effect. However, correlation
between y and Gy (0.083) is much stronger than that between y and both G2y (0.040),
7The variable indicating different school tracks takes 9 values such as: 1= LWOO; 2=LWOO/ VMBO-
Basis and Kaderberoepsgerichte; 3=VMBO-Basis and Kaderberoepsgerichte; 4=VMBO-Basis and Kader-
beroepsgerichte / VMBO-theoretisch; 5=VMBO-theoretisch; 6=VMBO-theoretisch / HAVO; 7=HAVO;
8=HAVO / VWO; 9=VWO, where VMBO is ‘voorbereidend middelbaar beroepsonderwijs’, the middle-
level applied education, divided in basic, middle-management (kaderberoepsgerichte) and theoretical
(theoretisch). HAVO is ‘Hoger algemeen voortgezet onderwijs’ (higher general education), and VWO
‘voorbereidend wetenschappelijk onderwijs’ (preparatory scholarly education). Finally, LWOO is ‘Leer-
wegondersteunend onderwijs’ (learning path supporting education) for pupils with special needs.
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Figure 3: Network Features. ‘Networks and Actor Attributes in Early Adolescence’ (Wave
4).
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Table 3: Descriptive statistics
Variable Mean/Share Std. deviation Min Max
Doing homework Very True 0.1432 0 1
True 0.3353 0 1
Sometimes 0.4317 0 1
not true 0.0797 0 1
not true at all 0.0201 0 1
Female 0.4777 0 1
Dutch spoken at home 0.9111 0 1
Type of secondary school Track 1 0.0342 0 1
Track 2 0.0267 0 1
Track 3 0.0302 0 1
Track 4 0.0074 0 1
Track 5 0.0801 0 1
Track 6 0.3402 0 1
Track 7 0.0320 0 1
Track 8 0.3616 0 1
Track 9 0.0876 0 1
At least one smoking parent 0.5152 0 1
Euros received from the parents 28.8520 44.7497 0 1000
Age 12.1025 0.4846 10 15
N. of observations 2284
N. of schools 14
‘Networks and Actor Attributes in Early Adolescence’ (Wave 4). Authors’ calculations on the estimation sample.
Figure 4: Doing homework: distribution, ‘Networks and Actor Attributes in Early Ado-
lescence’ (Wave 4)
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and G3y (0.033). Notice also that G2y and G3y are almost perfectly correlated (0.984).
Table 4: Correlations in behaviour at distance 1, 2, 3
y Gy G2y G3y
y 1.000 0.083 0.040 0.033
Gy 0.083 1.000 0.894 0.845
G2y 0.040 0.894 1.000 0.984
G3y 0.033 0.845 0.984 1.000
N 2284
‘Networks and Actor Attributes in Early Adolescence’ (Wave 4). Authors’ calculations on the estimation sample.
Table 5 reports the results of a OLS regression.8 We run 6 specifications: in (1) we
regress individual behavior on Gy. In (2) and (3) we add, respectively G2y and G3y. In
specifications (4)-(6) G3y is excluded and controls are included. Consider specifications
(1)-(3). In specification (1) the coefficient associated to Gy is positive and highly sig-
nificant, consistently with the presence of peer effects. In specification (2) Gy and G2y
are significant at the 1% level. However, while the coefficient of the former is positive,
the coefficient of the latter is negative. The introduction of G2y makes the coefficient
associated to Gy increase, suggesting that in (1) it was downward biased due an omitted
variable bias. The sign of the bias is perfectly in line with our theoretical model.9
Adding G3y does not improve our model (see specification (3)). Indeed G3y does not
have any explanatory power, since its coefficient is almost negligible and not significant.
Notice that in specification (3) G2y is negative, but not significant. The result is probably
due to the strong multicollinearity between G2y and G3y (see Table 4) inflating the
standard errors, and making the t-test drop. Notice also that the introduction of G3y
does not make the R2 increase, again suggesting that the variable does not have any
explanatory power. For this reason, our preferred specification does not include G3y.
In specifications (4)-(6) we enriched (2) by adding individual, friends’, class and school
controls, and the results are pretty stable and similar to those in specification (2).10
8As a robustness check we also ran all the specifications excluding singletons and using ordered probit.
Results are robust and available upon request.
9Recall that the omitted variable bias is given by the product of the effect of G2y on y (negative
because of substitution at distance-two), and the coefficient of a regression on Gy on G2y (positive
because of complementarity at distance-one)
10Regressions in Table 5 do not allow to unravel the direct effect of local congestion from the equilibrium
cascade effect, nor to separate the effect of the peer effect/local congestion from the effects of similarities
due to network formation. Such tests have been carried out and shown that network formation alone
does not explain correlations in behavior. Results are available upon request.
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Given OLS may not be consistent due to spatial correlation, we also performed an
instrumental variable estimation (using two stages least squares, 2SLS) and instrumenting
G2y and G3y with the the average demographics of the friends of friends, as well as those
of the distance-three and distance-four friends. Our results are in line with those obtained
via OLS.11 Tests on the first stages suggest that instruments may be weak. To overcome
this problem, we report the Anderson-Rubin (AR) test statistics for which identification
of the coefficients is not assumed.12 Figure 5 shows the area where the model is not
misspecified, i.e. when the peer effect is positive and the effect of distance-two friends is
negative, confirming the result of the 2SLS.
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Figure 5: Anderson-Rubin (AR) test statistics for the overidentified IV model.
6 Conclusions
We have studied games where the pattern of agents’ interaction is determined by a net-
work of social relations. Along with peer effects between neighbors, the network induces
strategic substitution between agents who share one or more neighbors. We have referred
to this indirect effect as local congestion. We have looked at the predictions of this class of
models, and have compared how individual and aggregate behaviors depart from a model
11Results are available upon request.
12The value of the under-identification, over-identification, and the F-test on excluded instruments are
available under request. The AR test is a joint test on the parameters and on the exogeneity of the
instruments and rejects the null when one or both conditions do not hold.
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with peer effects only. In particular, we have focused on how equilibrium actions relate
to network centrality, and to network density. We have also extended some of our results
on local congestion to more general interaction patterns on the network.
We believe our results provide valuable insights on the relation between the topology
of social networks and behavior. These insights should be taken into account in designing
policies that target these relations. Moreover, our analysis can be used to interpret em-
pirical evidence on the distribution of certain types of behaviors in social networks. For
instance, our result concerning the reversal of the ranking of Bonacich centralities (see
Proposition 3 and the ensuing example) provides a novel explanation of the prevalence of
smoking at the periphery of the network recorded in Christakis and Fowler (2008). This
explanation views the gradual marginalization of smokers as an equilibrium phenomenon
due to the congestion of central players, rather than a result of changes in the structure
of the network in terms of a progressive severance of relational links with heavy smokers.
We see at least two interesting extension of the model we propose. First, equilibria
with strong substitution effects and inactive agents may be relevant in many economic
problems, and an analysis of how local congestion would affect this class of equilibria
would be certainly of interest. Second, an estimation of the structural parameters of the
model would be needed to design effective policies in problems when local congestion plays
a substantial role.
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A Micro fundation of Utility
This appendix presents three examples of economic problems with different forms of local
congestion producing utility function in (1).
Production networks. Consider a district where a set of monopolistic firms are linked
by mutual supply relations. Firm i’s product is both demanded by consumers in final
market i and used as input by i’s neighbors.13 Each firm i produces according to a
Leontief technology with constant returns to scale, transforming the set of employed
inputs Yi ≡ {yj : gij = 1} into the production level xi:
fi(Yi) =
1
k
min{yj ∈ Yi} (A.1)
Denoting by pj the price for commodity j for j = 1, 2, ..., n, the marginal cost of each firm
i is constant and equal to:
ci = k
∑
j∈N
gijpj (A.2)
Demand for commodity i is given by the following function:
xi = Ai +Di − pi (A.3)
13For simplicity, we are assuming that links are undirected, so that if a firm provides an input to
another firm, also the latter provides an input to the former.
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where Ai is the size of i’s consumers’ market, and Di is the demand for input i coming
from i’s neighbors. From the Leontief technology specification, it follows that:
Di = k
∑
j∈N
gijxj. (A.4)
Each firm maximizes its profit as a monopolist:
pii(x) = (Ai +Di − xi − ci)xi = (Ai − xi + k
∑
j∈N
gijxj − k
∑
j∈N
gijpj)xi (A.5)
Substituting the expression of each price pj from the appropriate demand function pj =
Aj − xj +
∑
k gjkxk, we obtain:
pii(x) = (Ai − k
∑
j∈N
gijAj)xi − x2i + 2k
∑
j∈N
gijxixj − k2
∑
j∈N
∑
k∈N
gijgjkxixk (A.6)
which can be written as (1) once we set αi = (Ai − k
∑
j gijAj), σ = 2, φ = 2k and
γ = k2. Note how firm i’s production is increasing in i’s neighbors’ production (strategic
complementarities) and linearly decreasing in the production of firms that share a common
input provider with i (substitution at distance-two in the network), as in McCann and
Folta (2008, 2009).
Scientific collaborations. The network g describes the pattern of collaborations be-
tween scientists. The action xi measures the degree of research activity of scientist i.
Collaborations are governed by complementarities, so that the larger the action of i’s
co-authors, the larger i’s incentive to act. However, i’s co-authors compete for the limited
research effort of their co-authors, so the degree of complementarity decreases with the
effort exerted at distance-two. We model the utility in the following linear quadratic form:
Ui(x) = αixi − σ
2
x2i + φxi
∑
j∈N
gij[xj − γ1
∑
k∈N
gjkxk] (A.7)
The parameter γ1 measures the impact of competing projects in which a given co-author
is involved on the benefits drawn from an ongoing project with that co-author. This
expression is equivalent to (1) once we set γ = γ1φ.
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Local negative externalities. Consider a set of agents whose actions produce local
negative externalities that accumulate in stocks (e.g, transfrontier pollution). The stock
at an agent’s location is given by the sum of her neighbors’ actions. Each agent suffers
a convex damage, which depends on her own stock and on a fraction of her neighbors’
stocks. Possible examples of such situations are environmental games where the pollutant
that accumulates from neighbors emissions leaks into neighboring locations. Alternative
interpretations include social interaction problems where individual behavior has detri-
mental effects on friends and/or relatives (smoking, delinquency, skipping school), and
where one’s perceived damage is affected by the observation of friends’ and relatives’
conditions. For example, a smoker’s awareness of his health risks may increase when a
friend falls ill, which happens with higher probability the larger the amount of secondhand
smoke this friend is exposed to. To model such situations, let for each i
Qi ≡
(
xi +
∑
k∈N
gikxk
)
(A.8)
denote the stock of pollutant that generates from local emissions in the neighborhood of
i, which leaks into i′s neighborhood. Assuming quadratic damage, we get the following
utility function:
Ui(x) = αixi + θ
∑
j∈N
gijxixj −
(Qi + γ1
∑
j gijQj)
2
2
(A.9)
The parameter γ1 measures the amount of leakage between neighboring locations.
Expanding the squared terms, we obtain the following expression:
αixi − x
2
i
2
+ (θ − 1− 3γ1)
∑
j∈N
gijxixj − γ1xi
∑
j∈N
∑
k∈N
gijgjkxk + h(x−i) (A.10)
where the term h(x−i) does not depend on xi and thus does not affect optimal choices.
Apart from the term h(x−i), (A.10) can be rewritten as (1) by setting σ = 1, φ =
(θ − 1− 3γ1) and γ = γ1.
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B Proofs
Proof of Proposition 1. To prove the proposition we first state and prove the following
lemma.
Lemma 1 Let y∗i the shift associated to µi∗(G) in (7). If either
µi∗(G) <
φ−√−4γσ + 4γλφy∗i + φ2
2γ
or
µi∗(G) >
φ+
√−4γσ + 4γλφy∗i + φ2
2γ
,
then a unique interior equilibrium exists.
Proof of Lemma 1.
Proof. Consider equation (5). Consider also µ(C) and µ(G˜). Recall that for all i < n
µi(C) ≥ µi+1(C) and µi(G˜) ≥ µi+1(G˜). We first prove that (7) defines a monotone map
with the following property:
µ1(C) ≥ µ1(G˜) ≥ µ2(C) ≥ µ2(G˜) · ·· ≥ µn(C) ≥ µn(G˜) (B.1)
Given C and G˜ are both Hermitian with n eigenvalues, by Weyl inequality14 µi(C) ≤
µi−j(G˜) + µ1+j(U), for all i = 1, . . . , n and j = 0, . . . , n − 1. Recall also U is such
that µ1(U) = n and µi(U) = 0 for all i = 2, . . . , n, and consider the inequality above for
j ∈ {0, 1}. If j = 0 then µi(C) ≤ µi(G˜)+µ1(U); if j = 1 then µi(C) ≤ µi−1(G˜). It follows
that µi−j(G˜) ≤ µi(C) ≤ µi(G˜) + µ1(U). This implies that the map (7) transforming the
eigenvalues of G˜ into the eigenvalues of C preserves the ordering.
We are now able to derive the condition for existence. Recall that a sufficient condition
for the existence of an interior equilibrium is µ1(C) <
σ
φλ
. This condition, using (7), can
be written as 1
λ
µ1(G˜) + y1 <
σ
φλ
. Consider the eigenvalue µi∗(G) which maps into µ1(G˜)
in (5), i.e., 1 = ρ(i∗). Using (5), we can rewrite the sufficient condition for the existence
of an interior equilibrium as follows:
1
λ
µi∗(G)− γ
λφ
[µi∗(G)]
2 + yi∗ <
σ
φλ
(B.2)
14See, for example, Horn and Johnson (2012), p.241.
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By noticing that − γ
λφ
< 0 and solving for µi∗(G) the result immediately follows.
We can now prove Proposition 1.
Recall (6) and consider yi, for all i = 1, . . . , n. By the Wielandt-Hoffman theorem
15
| µi(C) − 1λµi(G˜) |= yi ≤ θnλ , being n = µ1(U). Given yi ≥ 0 for each i, the following
holds:
φλ
σ
µi(C) =
1
σ
(φµi(G)− γµ2i (G) + φλyi) ≤
1
σ
(φµi(G)− γµ2i (G) + φθn) < 1
We recall that from the definition of G˜ it follows that θ = γ
φ
d¯. Then the last inequality
becomes
1
σ
(φµi(G)− γµ2i (G) + γd¯n) < 1. (B.3)
If the roots of the polynomial on the left hand side are complex, the inequality is
satisfied for all µi(G), which drives to the condition i) in the proposition.
To prove condition ii), consider now the case in which d¯ > d̂. Assume µ1(G) <
φ
2γ
, so
the LHS of (B.3) is monotonically increasing in µi(G), and consequently µi(G) <
φ
2γ
for
all i = 2, . . . , n. Notice that 1
λ
µ1(G)− γλφ [µ1(G)]2 is strictly monotone and increasing in
µ1(G), once its domain is restricted to the interval (−∞, φ2γ ]. This monotonicity implies
i∗ = 1 so that µi∗(G) = µ1(G). Then the existence conditions can be written just in
terms of µ1(G). Moreover, being d¯ > d̂ ≡ σnφγ − φ4nφγ2 , then
√−4γσ + 4γλφy1 + φ2 is
real-valued, and
φ−
√
−4γσ+4γλφy1+φ2
2γ
< φ
2γ
<
φ+
√
−4γσ+4γλφy1+φ2
2γ
. Being µ1(G) <
φ
2γ
only
the first part of the inequality is binding and the result immediately follows by applying
Proposition 1.
Consider now condition iii). This immediately follows from the fact that if µ1(G) >
φ
2γ
then it is generally true that µ1(G) 6= µi∗(G). Then we just need to apply Lemma 1 to
the correct µi∗(G).
Proof of Proposition 2.
Proof. FOCs in (2) yield
α
σ
· 1 =
[
I− φ
σ
G +
γ
σ
G2
]
x. (B.4)
Consider now the symmetric matrix
15See, for example, Horn and Johnson (2012), p.40.
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[
I− φ
σ
G +
γ
σ
G2
]
. (B.5)
If two scalars a1 and a2 exist that solve the following system:
a1 + a2 =
φ
σ
(B.6)
a1a2 =
γ
σ
(B.7)
then (B.5) can be written as:
[
I− (a1 + a2)G + a1a2G2
]
= [I− a1G] · [I− a2G] (B.8)
Solving the constraints in (B.6) and (B.7) we get two pairs (a1, a2):
a1 =
φ±√φ2 − 4γσ
2σ
(B.9)
a2 =
φ∓√φ2 − 4γσ
2σ
(B.10)
well defined if and only if φ > 2
√
γσ.
We can now rewrite (B.4) as follows:
α
σ
· 1 = [I− a1G] · [I− a2G] x. (B.11)
If µ1(G) <
1
max{a1,a2} , then both inverses [I− a1G]−1 and [I− a2G]−1 are well defined,
and (B.11) yields:
x =
α
σ
[I− a2G]−1 · [I− a1G]−1 · 1 (B.12)
Since by definition of Bonacich centrality:
[I− a2G]−1 · 1 = b(G, a2) (B.13)
we can then apply the definition of weighted Bonacich centrality and write:
x =
α
σ
bb(G,a1)(G, a2) (B.14)
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Proof of Proposition 3. Proof. We study the derivative of (11) with respect to γ
at the point γ = 0. Note first that when γ = 0 then a1 =
φ
γ
and a2 = 0. Immediate
computations also give the following expressions when γ = 0:
b(G, a2)
∣∣∣∣
γ=0
= 1;
∂a1
∂γ
∣∣∣∣
γ=0
= −1
φ
;
∂a2
∂γ
∣∣∣∣
γ=0
=
1
φ
;
∂b(G, a2)
∂a2
∣∣∣∣
γ=0
= d, (B.15)
where in the last expression d denotes the vector of degrees in G.
We can then write the total derivative of the equilibrium actions’ vector with respect
to γ as follows:
dx
dγ
∣∣∣∣
γ=0
=
∂M(G, a1)
∂γ
∣∣∣∣
γ=0
· b(G, a2) + M(G, a1) · ∂b(G, a2)
∂γ
∣∣∣∣
γ=0
(B.16)
Replacing terms from (B.15) we obtain:
dx
dγ
∣∣∣∣
γ=0
=
∂M(G, a1)
∂a1
(−1
φ
)
∣∣∣∣
γ=0
· 1 + M(G, a1) · d
φ
(B.17)
The term ∂M(G,a1)
∂a1
is computed by using the expression of the matrix M(G, a1):
∂M(G, a1)
∂a1
=
∂
∂a1
[I− a1G]−1 = −[I− aG]−1 · ∂[I− aG]
∂a1
· [I− aG]−1 (B.18)
or, equivalently,
−[I− a1G]−1 · −G · [I− a1G]−1 (B.19)
Substituting back in (B.17) and factorizing terms we obtain:
dx
dγ
∣∣∣∣
γ=0
=
1
φ
·M(G, φ
σ
) ·
(
d−G ·M(G, φ
σ
) · 1
)
(B.20)
or, using the definition of Bonacich centrality vector,
dx
dγ
∣∣∣∣
γ=0
=
1
φ
·M(G, φ
σ
) ·
(
d−G · b(G, φ
σ
)
)
(B.21)
Proof of Proposition 4.
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Proof. Consider first a node k 6∈ Z such that gkz = 0 for all z ∈ Z. We have g˜ki = g˜′ki
for all i ∈ N . Consider then a node k 6∈ Z such that gki = 1 for at least one i ∈ Z. We
have that g˜′ki < g˜ki and g˜
′
kz ≤ g˜kz for all z ∈ Z. Consider now any two nodes i, j ∈ Z, for
which, by construction, g′ij − gij = 1. We also have g
′[2]
ij − g[2]ij = |Z|−2, since all nodes in
Z are now linked with each other. Thus g˜′ij − g˜ij = 1 − ργφ ≤ 0 since we have assumed
that φ ≤ (|Z|−2)γ. Thus, g˜′ij ≤ g˜ij for all i, j ∈ Z with at least one strict inequality.16
Proof of Proposition 6. Proof. Consider the FOCs we report below here
α · 1 =
[
σI− φ1G˜
]
x, (B.22)
where the adjacency matrix G˜ of strategic interaction is defined as follows:
G˜ ≡ G +
R∑
r=2
φr
φ1
Gr. (B.23)
Then we can write
[
σI− φ1G˜
]
=
R∏
r=1
[I− arGr] (B.24)
provided there exists a set A = {ar}r=1,...,R satisfying it. Moreover notice that (B.24) holds
independently of the order of the product since matrices are symmetric. By induction it
can be shown that the set A is such that φ1
σ
is the sum of all ar,
φ2
σ
is the sum of the
double products of elements in A times −1, φ3
σ
is the sum of the triple products, φ4
σ
is the
sum of the quadruple products times −1, and so on. Formally we get φr
σ
= Sr.
16Our result builds on Theorem 2 in Ballester et al. (2006), showing that increasing all entries in the
network of social interactions unambiguously increases equilibrium behavior of all agents.
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